Reprinted from Campaigns &
Elections, August, 1993
The recent special election for Lloyd Bentsen's seat not only brought the Republican party one seat closer to power in the U.S. Senate, it also provided insight to Ross Perot's future in electoral politics. The results of the process to replace Bentsen in the Lone Star State demonstrate that Perot is likely to have trouble building an organization with long-term political efficacy.
Our firm worked for the campaign of Richard Fisher, a conservative Democrat and successful Dallas businessman, who was an advisor to Perot's 1992 campaign and co-authored Perot's book United We Stand. Thirteen candidates were on the ballot, but only Fisher (D), interim Senator Bob Krueger (D), attorney Jose Angel Gutierrez (D), Texas Treasurer Kay Bailey Hutchison (R), Congressman Jack Fields (R), and Congressman Joe Barton (R) were considered major candidates.
In this election, we were able to observe, both from public opinion data and anecdotal evidence, the effect Perot, his message, and his organization had on influencing voters in his home state, and assess what potential effect the Perot movement may have in the future as Perot attempts to increase his following and clout in '94 and '96.
To assess Perot's political impact in the next election cycle, including the mid-term races, several important questions must be asked. First, does the "first" Perot organization still exist -- those who signed petitions for the businessman-politician "sometime" in 1992. The people are still there, of course, but in Texas, we found Perot supporters unresponsive to campaign activities, contacts, mailings, and advertising -- much of which was especially targeted at them. This suggests that politically reactivating these voters, on behalf of candidates other than Perot himself, to the level of October and November of 1992 will be difficult.
Second, the larger group of Perotistas -- those who report having voted for him for President in 1992 -- shoed themselves as even less interested in politics and are definitely not political information-seekers or activist. In Texas, Perot voters were the last to decide in the primary compared to Bush or Clinton voters, and on all measures of political opinion, interest, or awareness the Perot voters scored the lowest compared to both Clinton and Bush voters.
Third, the Perot voters in Texas are largely nay-sayers -- many wags would say "just like their leader." In our polls, nationally and in Texas, we have found Perot voters to be slightly more male, non-college educated, working class -- but only slightly. The only major area where the Perot voters differed significantly from the electorate as a whole was in the level and intensity with which they agreed that the government was foul, off-track, corrupt, and unresponsive. While many non-Perot voters are also angry, voters who supported Perot in 1992 are unusually incensed and disgusted with the political system.
Fourth, as expected, the Perot voters were more independent with weaker partisan attachments than either Bush or Clinton voters, although large numbers of them had some level of party identification (two national surveys since the election have shown that 84 percent of the Perot voters have some partisan leaning, as measured by a party image scale). In Texas, and in all of the recent national surveys, this Perotista partisanship leans decidedly Republican. This presents an interesting question: Are the present GOP tendencies of the Perot voters a) inherent and longstanding, b) held because of congruence with their political ideology, or c) simply identification with the outs against the ins? We believe the answer is all of the above, but that the last point, anti-establishment views, is the most important factor.
Fifth, Perot supporters exhibit some of the traits of a cult of personality, but they may not be willing to transfer their allegiance to surrogate candidates. In the Texas Senate primary, Richard Fisher had the closest ties to Perot on the surface, and his campaign specifically stressed Perot's basic message regarding money and influence peddling as the cause of Washington gridlock. In our polling, however, Fisher's support among Perot voters hovered around the low double digits in the standard "vote for" question throughout the campaign. When Fisher's involvement with Perot was explained to voters (Using a projective research technique) and it was suggested he might be Perot's favorite, Fisher jumped to 49 percent support among the Perot voters -- 15 percentage points more than his favorable recognition rating with these voters.
At the end of the primary, however, Fisher was only receiving about 8 percent - 12 percent of the former Perot voters in the tracking polls while the remainder split between the other candidates -- almost perfectly along their partisan (albeit weak) lines. Preference among Perot voters followed the general trend reported in the closing days by the press: Krueger held most of the small group of Democratic Perot voters, losing some to Fisher and some to Hutchison. The larger group of Perot Republicans, who had earlier split between the three major Republican candidates, moved decidedly toward Hutchison, the acknowledged favorite of the GOP establishment.
In a re-interview survey immediately after the Texas primary, we showed a huge Hutchison lead over Krueger (58 percent - 24 percent -- close to the final outcome) among all voters statewide. At the heart of the issue is that Perot voters, at this point, already preferred Hutchison over Krueger by a 69 percent - 7 percent margin a week into the run-off. These findings clearly show the GOP leanings of the Texas Perot voters and foreshadowed the "endorsement" of Hutchison by a reported 84 percent of the Texas United We Stand America (UWSA) members three weeks later.
The candidates in Texas all stressed issues associated principally with Perot in the 1992 campaign, but most pollsters would say that these issues already existed in the electorate before Perot began to promote them. However, even if Perot had some effect on the political dialogue, his voters basically returned to their past political behavior and voted their partisan inclination -- or stayed home. Without direct heavy and early involvement by Perot - - himself and his money -- it is difficult to see any permanent or lasting impact by Perot on who gets elected in non-Presidential elections.
Clearly, in 1992, Perot scooped up much of the politically alternated, minimally involved, working, middle-aged segment of the American electorate. He did so at a time when the mood in the country was adamantly for change -- a modern day American political revolution. Voters had the opportunity to focus their efforts and attention on a single event (the 1992 general election) to make a statement about change. The intensity and breadth of this mood even appealed to Americans who previously had been minimally involved in politics.
However, the revolution came and went, and by early 1993 many voters, regardless of who they voted for in November, were saying "the revolution is over, we made our statement, let the politicians work out the rest." The public was tired of activist democracy. In Texas, the situation was worse. Four weeks before the primary election only 53% of the potential electorate could volunteer the incumbent's (Krueger) name and even fewer (41%) of those who voted for Perot were aware of Krueger. Awareness of the other major candidates was even lower among Perot voters. The "Perot vote" in Texas was not then a new avenging sword that was destined to slash through the lethargic political system. Quite the opposite: Perot voters had "quieted down" even more so than the rest of the laconic Texas electorate.
The national polls are inflating Perot's potential influence because they are measuring public opinion at the nadir of both parties, and without any context of an election. Thus, when pollsters then come along asking about Ross Perot and the political mood, these "semi-participants" in the political process are given a free shot to bitch and gripe about the system. Most of these voters are '92 Perot voters; a few are marginal partisans who don't like what is going on. Given their dissatisfaction with the political process, most of these naggers aren't likely to vote in next year's mid-term elections; many may not vote in '96. In short, they will have less actual impact on the electoral outcome than the polls now suggest.
The Texas primary process demonstrates some of the pitfalls Perot faces in building a permanent third force in American politics. The recent contest in Texas shows that in an election with a relatively low overall turnout and lacking significant, direct involvement form Perot, his prior voters will behave according to their long held partisanship. This will be especially true if any Perot surrogate candidate does not have enough money to compete equally with at least one of the two major party candidates. Even in Texas, where Fisher did compete on television with the major party candidates, he could not break through the voters' lethargy. In the future, without Perot on any non-Presidential ballot, the Republican party can prove they'll get most of "his" vote anyway in a two-way or three-way race, making it difficult for Perot (or the new Independence Party) to recruit anything but fringe or light- weight candidates. How, then, does he hold together or expand his movement if these factors diminish his ability to participate successfully in the 1994 electoral cycle?
The national polls have Ross Perot riding high now largely because it is easy to be against a sitting President who has admittedly bungled much of his early efforts, and an opposition party which has yet to set forth a new leader or positive program after a disastrous rebuff of their 12 year stewardship. At this point, Perot can spend the most money to influence the information flow to the public. But, if the Texas election says anything, it suggests that Perot will have difficulty building a large, continuing, and functioning organization to serve as a vehicle for him or his supporters to gain elected positions of power. Texas proves that most of his 1992 vote is likely to either vote their own partisan feelings or not vote at all, at least in 1994 -- without big personal money and maximum effort from Perot. In short, his political fortunes will likely rise and fall inversely to that of the incumbent President's, which, in the end, will determine his future strength as a candidate.
Money can buy Perot the gadfly role in American politics; a role that he and the public currently seem to enjoy. This role will have the impact of forcing the political dialogue on certain questions, and may maximize the anger the electorate has toward the political system, but is not likely to provide the answers to these questions to alleviate that anger. The Texas results do lend credence to other reports from the field of increasing complaints by Perot volunteers that the Perot organization is hollow and manipulated from above. They show the huge problem Perot will have in mobilizing voter support for surrogate candidates in the less intense, lower turnout mid-year election. Ross will keep on truckin' -- but to where?
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