Reprinted from Campaigns &
Elections, August, 1999
Political candidates, from State
legislators to U.S. Senators, statewide office to local
government, talk openly about their experiences in their
recent campaigns -- and they tell a story which a
political scientist would characterize as "instant
political socialization". This finding comes from
focus groups and in-depth interviews conducted among
candidates of the two major political parties for Campaigns
& Elections magazine and the University of
Maryland through a grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts.
Politicians we talked to as part of this landmark survey process said they changed their opinions of campaigning early in their electoral experiences – enough so that most became invested in the process of electioneering.
This doesn’t mean that today’s’ political candidates are adapting their political philosophy or ideology or their desire to win public service. Whether they won or lost, political candidates we talked to were still true to their initial beliefs and policy positions and maintain a desire to serve.
What has changed is their view of the campaign process itself. While they initially thought of the campaigns as part of the total political picture, now that’s over, they separate campaigning from the rest of politics and governing.
Campaigns are viewed by candidates as a unique transition phase through which they must pass so they can do the good things – like impacting public policy – that attracted them to politics in the first place. They have accepted this new phase but admit, however, that "souls made of lesser steel than themselves" would quake in fear at the reality of the tough, harsh nature of campaigning.
We found that a surprisingly large proportion of candidates began their metamorphosis even before their first campaign was ended. Others finished their first campaign, whether they won or lost, thinking "OK, now I know how it works; now I see what I should and shouldn’t do; now I understand the rules we are playing under."
Were the rules they had learned corrupting or strengthening, good or evil in their minds? Most candidates accepted the new modes of operation because they said they worked – either to defeat their opponent or to be defeated by them. It was not, to them, a question of whether they were forced to abide by good or bad rules, norms or standards while campaigning. Rather, they began to see politics through a new set of lenses. They perceived this passage as having little or no impact o how they would (or did) serve in elective office. But it was, in a deeper sense, a different means to the end than they had expected.
Most perceived that traversing through these gates of hell as having little or no impact on how they would (or did) serve in election elective office. But was a different means to the end than they had expected.
The level of office sought seems to have little to do with this socialization process. Those running for Congress or statewide offices, however, were slightly more prone to undergo this changed perspective soon after beginning the campaign.
The rate of socialization among state legislative candidates, for example, depended somewhat on the size of their districts and campaign budgets. As with candidates for higher offices, the learning curve was evident, but just not as steep. It can only be surmised that non-two party candidates, especially for lower level races, were even less affected.
The socialization process, however, was true of both winners and losers regardless of office. While Democrats exhibit slightly more concern over money in campaigns, few candidates were willing to self-impose voluntary fundraising limitations on their own campaigns.
What specifically were these new rules and norms for campaigning? Their perceptions produced four general conclusions: First, these candidates were mostly pleased with their campaign consultants and felt they had explained to them the new campaign politics. Second, by and large, the press was often viewed as spread too thin or just lazy, simplistic and generally not helpful in carrying campaign messages to the public. Third, because of this, candidates said it was necessary to raise plenty of money to communicate and control messages to voters. Fourth, the candidates think voters best remember negative or comparative advertising – requiring candidates who have been attacked to "hit back" quickly.
Professional Advisors
Most of the candidates focus grouped, winners and losers, had used consultants in their campaigns and said they would probably use the same ones again. Consultants were generally not seen as bad influences on campaigning or democracy. Rather, they’re viewed more as professional advisors who understand, interpret and teach the mechanics (and realities) of the political campaign process to candidates. They are seen not as the rule makers of modern campaigns but as facilitators who make the rules understandable to them.
A few candidates said they were taught so well how to react to attaches that they had to be "reined in" by their consultants who often had to soften their rhetoric and inclination to "hit back hard." Such explanations centered on the strategic and not the proprietary difference between using a "scalpel instead of a meat ax" when responding or counterattacking.
Candidates viewed the consultants as interpreters of the modern language of proactive, combative and expensive communication politics, not as promulgators and perpetuators of that language.
Effective Press?
Views of the news media were more complex. While reporters were usually not seen as being very helpful in providing voters with political information or in establishing a forum to further the discussion of issues, former candidates thought the press had, for the most part, told an accurate, if only simplified, story. This was especially true of incumbents who had run for higher offices in markets where the news business was most competitive.
Nonetheless, most candidates view the working press as being "too lazy and simplistic." They believe that reporters don’t really understand the myriad of issues that effect their elections and are, therefore, often easier to manipulate. Many also believe that the press toes into each campaign with preconceived notions that ultimately defines their coverage, regardless of what the candidates try to say or do that is contrary to those misinformed perceptions. (This finding,. It should be noted, is at some variance with the results of the quantitative state legislative candidate survey previously reported in this issue. Of course, focus groups analyzed here include federal and statewide level candidates which the state legislative candidate survey did not.)
TV news was not seen be the focus group participants as a good way for candidates to get out their messages. They said they didn’t get enough coverage and, often, the coverage they did get misinterpreted their message to the voters. Few even mentioned televised debates. Newspaper editorial boards did come in for criticism based on having their own agenda which related little to what the electorate (and the candidates) wanted.
Both winning and losing candidates believe it is very difficult to use the press to communicate with the voters. They say that they either had to ride the wave of the media’s pre-existing agenda or they had to create their own agenda by buying advertising to reach the electorate.
So Much Money
A successful candidate was seen as one who controls his or her message by raising enough money to deliver that message. Whether a rural state House district in Georgia, or a large state Senate district in California, or a mixed urban/suburban congressional district in Ohio, candidates decried the need to raise so much money and expressed their frustration over the amount of time it takes.
Nonetheless, few recent candidates wanted a complete overhaul of the campaign finance system. Since most of them, win or lose, now understand how to compete under the existing rules, they are reluctant to change them. In particular, they reacted unfavorably toward self-imposed voluntary restrictions such as campaign spending, contribution, time and advertising limits, saying "I won’t unilaterally disarm in this tough, competitive campaign atmosphere."
Candidates interviewed said that money was important to get out their messages because the press, political parties, and volunteers were no longer sufficient message delivery systems for campaigns. Without being able to deliver a focused and repetitive message, candidates believe they can’t win – especially if they’re under opposition attack.
Pointed out one recent candidate: "I needed 1000 [gross rating] points [ of television time] a week to sell the two major messages of my campaign. Plus, I needed to hold some TV money back to respond in case I was attacked." Lamented another: "Each mailing cost $17,000 , and I had to mail five or six times to the same target group to get out a message."
In most cases, political party committees at various levels were seen as being helpful to their candidates both in terms of directing money to them and providing campaign services and intelligence – although many comments showed a strained relationship between the candidates and their party committees.
Independent expenditures came in for mixed reviews – from both Democrats and Republicans. A few candidates said IEs had helped them, but even more did not appreciate losing control of the content, context, direction or tenor of the campaign’s agenda to an external group. Some said that independent groups often do more harm than good because they confuse voters and often alter the messages the campaigns are seen as communicating.
Yet most candidates are not eager to see the rise in campaign spending and the pressures of fundraising on candidates go unchecked. But there was no consensus on how to accomplish that goal. The only real consensus was the need for instant reporting of all campaign finances. There appears to be considerable agreement, as one candidate put it: "Let’s campaign in the sunshine; let’s report all contributions and expenditures instantly."
Going Negative?
Candidates had two initial reactions to negative and comparative campaigning: First, they all said they came into the political process committed to explaining their issue positions and policy priorities to voters. For many though, this laudable idea lasted only until the second or third shot was fired across their bow – or until a poll showed a significant drop in their standings due to an opponent’s attack.
Some candidates who said they ran entirely positive campaigns, and who lost, concluded, as one said: "Never again will I stay all positive in the face of my opponent’s attacks."
Winning and losing candidates say that voters best remember and react most deeply to campaign advertising that is either negative or comparative. Consequently, they came to learn a lesson: Never allow any attack against you to stand.
Second, most candidates reacted unfavorably to using the term negative in the context of campaign advertising and message delivery. It was their position that tough, comparative advertising, based on issues and candidate records and not on personal characteristics, was most effective. Yet, when pushed, many agreed that even a personal dimension might have a place in attack advertising if it is relevant to an opponent’s campaign message.
The bottom line of this research is that a broad range of candidates, both winners and losers, having participated in small and big races, come to learn the language, concepts, and rules of the road through which professional political consultants and news reporters navigate.
Many start off as civic-minded "purists" trying to convey to the voters specific views on what they believe to be vital matters of public policy. But by the end of their first campaign, most weld into the current regime of American political campaigning that has as its guiding light this precept: To win, you need to raise plenty of money so you can control the communication of a largely comparative message.
Candidates seem to adapt surprisingly well to what they see as the realities of winning, especially considering the significant changes in attitude that they say are forced upon them.
Interestingly, they believe they can adapt to the demands of the campaign process without changing or lessening their desire to serve the public or to maintain their policy principles and ideological convictions. It is for this reason that this 8unique socialization process does not turn them into agents for reforming the system which they have come all too well, they think, to understand.
METHODOLOGY NOTE: Four focus groups of recent candidates (a total of 21 participants) and five in-depth, one-on-one interviews were conducted by Dave Beattie and Bill Hamilton of Hamilton, Beattie & Staff, a Democratic polling firm, and Lori Weigel of Public Opinion Strategies, a Republican polling firm. Focus groups were held in Washington, D.C. (2) Atlanta, and Sacramento. Current elected officials from 12 states are represented, including one U.S. Senator, an unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate, an elected state regulator, 12 congressional candidates (8 winners, 4 losers), 10 state legislative candidates (5 winners, 5 losers) and one losing candidate for local sheriff and one for city council; 12 were Republicans and 14 were Democrats; 13 were federally elected officials; 5 were African-American. Interviews were audiotaped.
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